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We propose the use of intra-particle entanglement to enhance the security of a practical imple-
mentation of the Bennett-Brassard-1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution scheme. Intra-particle
entanglement is an attractive resource since it can be easily generated using only linear optics. Se-
curity is studied under a simple model of incoherent attack for protocols involving two or all five
mutually unbiased bases. In terms of efficiency of secret key generation and tolerable error rate,
the latter is found to be superior to the former. We find that states that allow secrecy distillation
are necessarily entangled, though they may be local. Since more powerful attacks by Eve obviously
exist, our result implies that security is a strictly stronger condition than entanglement for these
protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Bg,03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols [1] allow two distant parties, traditionally called Alice and Bob, to
produce a shared random bit string consisting of 0’s and 1’s known only to them, which can be used as a key to
encrypt and decrypt messages. Based on fundamental principles such as the no-cloning principle [2], in quantum
physics, QKD provides an unconditionally secure way to distribute random keys through insecure channels. In 1984,
the well known Bennett-Brassard (BB84) protocol, the first QKD protocol, was proposed [3]. The first entanglement
based QKD protocol was proposed by Ekert in 1991 [4], where violation of a local realist inequality [5] is used to check
the security of QKD. Subsequently, there have been several important theoretical advancements in understanding the
relation between security and nonlocality [6–8] and experimental demonstrations of BB84 and other QKD protocols
were discussed in [9–14]. In this connection, the violation of the Bell’s inequality was first monitored in an experiment
by Jennewein et. al.[15], but no quantitative measure of security was derived from the observed violation. Later, Ling
et. al. [16] performed an experiment on entanglement based QKD, in which the violation of Bell-CHSH inequality is
used to also quantify the degree of security according to the criterion of Ref. [8].
In this work, we provide a QKD scheme in which path-polarization entanglement in a single particle (also known
as intra-particle entanglement) is exploited. The four single-qubit symbol states of standard BB84 are replaced in our
proposal with single-particle states. As we show later, single-particle path-polarization entanglement offers security
against some side-channel attacks that can render vulnerable a practical implementation of BB84, even though BB84
is theoretically unbreakable [17].
Theoretically, we assume that the stations of Alice and Bob are private spaces that are inaccessible to the outside
world. However, in practice, a side-channel attack can be launched because their stations are not entirely isolated.
Such attacks rely on flaws in the devices, which may potentially have been rigged by eavesdropper Eve to reveal
information about settings and even outcomes. Examples of typical side channels are timing information on the
devices used, observations of power consumption or electromagnetic leaks bearing some heat signature of devices, or
even a click sound produced by an optical element.
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2Intra-particle entanglement was discussed by Basu et al. [18] using a Mach-Zehnder type interferometric set-up for
demonstrating the violation of non-contextuality, and the actual experiment using single neutrons was performed by
Hasegawa et al. [19]. Here we propose that the protocols for cryptography presented here can be performed practi-
cally using the same approach by appropriately replacing path-spin entanglement of neutrons with path-polarization
entanglement of photons.
II. INTRA-PARTICLE ENTANGLEMENT
Let us consider a photon that is initially polarized along the vertical direction (its state denoted by |0〉). Taking
into consideration its path (or position) variables, the joint path-polarization state can be written as
|ψ0〉ps = |V 〉s ⊗ |ψ0〉p (1)
where the subscripts p and s refer to the path and the spin (i.e., polarization) variables respectively. A photon in the
state |ψ0〉ps with Alice, is incident on a beam splitter (BS1), whose transmission and reflection probabilities are |α|2
and |β|2 respectively, where |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 (cf. Figure 1).
The reflected and transmitted states from BS1 are designated by |ψR〉 and |ψT 〉, respectively. Here we recall that
for any given lossless beam splitter, arguments using the unitarity condition show that for the particles incident on
the beam splitter, the phase shift between the transmitted and the reflected states of the particle is pi2 . Note that the
beam splitter acts only on the path-states without affecting the polarization state of the particles.
The state of a particle emergent from BS1 can then be written as
|ψ0〉ps → |ψ1〉ps = |V 〉s ⊗ (α|ψT 〉p + iβ|ψR〉p), (2)
where
|ψT 〉p ≡
(
0
1
)
, |ψR〉p ≡
(
1
0
)
|V 〉s ≡ |0〉s ≡
(
0
1
)
, |H〉s ≡ |1〉s ≡
(
1
0
)
(3)
Our simplest basis, called GA1 , can be generated without using the beam splitter:
|Ψ+〉 = |0〉s ⊗ |ψT 〉p
|Ψ−〉 = |1〉s ⊗ |ψT 〉p;
|Ψ∗+〉 = |0〉s ⊗ |ψR〉p;
|Ψ∗−〉 = |1〉s ⊗ |ψR〉p. (4)
A basis consisting of path-polarization entangled elements, and which is mutually unbiased with GA1 , is G
A
2 , given
in Eq. (5). It is produced by a linear optical set-up consisting of a beam splitter, a half-wave plate (HWP), a quarter-
wave plate (QWP) and a phase shifter (PS). For example, |Φ+〉 is produced from |Ψ+〉, by passing the particle
through a 50:50 beam splitter (BS1, in figure 1), applying HWP on the transmitted wave packet |ψT 〉p, followed by
the application of QWP on both arms. The HWP has the action |H〉s ↔ |V 〉s.
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
( |0〉s ± |1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψT 〉p ± i |0〉s − |1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψR〉p
)
,
|Φ∗±〉 =
1√
2
( |0〉s − |1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψT 〉p ± i |0〉s + |1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψR〉p
)
. (5)
The bases GA1 and G
A
2 are mutually unbiased in the sense that any element in either basis is an equal weight
superposition (apart from phase factors) of elements of the other basis.
In dimension d = 4, there are d + 1 = 5 mutually unbiased bases (MUBs). Another mutually unbiased entangled
basis, denoted GA3 , in addition to set (5), is:
|Λ±〉 = 1√
2
( |0〉s ± i|1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψT 〉p + i |0〉s − i|1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψR〉p
)
,
|Λ∗±〉 =
1√
2
( |0〉s − i|1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψT 〉p ± i |0〉s + i|1〉s√
2
⊗ |ψR〉p
)
. (6)
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FIG. 1: BB84 set-up: Alice transmits a state to Bob in one of the bases GAj by suitably applying the linear optical elements
of beam splitters, HWP, QWP and PS. Bob may recombine the reflected and the transmitted channels at BS2. Finally, Bob
performs path and polarization measurements using the polarizing beam splitters PBS1 and PBS2.
Two others (separable state) MUBs, which may be denoted GA4 and G
A
5 , can be produced by applying H ⊗H and
H ′ ⊗H ′ to the elements of basis (4), where H ≡ 12 (σz + σx), while H ′ ≡ 12 (σz + σy).
Alice’s states are analyzed in Bob’s system, consisting of a beam splitter (BS2), followed by polarization analyzer
in each output arm. For example, if she sends the state |Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉, then after emerging from BS2 (cf. Figure 1),
the corresponding resulting states at Bob’s site are given by
|Φ′+〉 =
1√
2
(i|χ1〉 ⊗ |ψ′T 〉+ |χ2〉 ⊗ |ψ′R〉),
|Φ′−〉 =
1√
2
(i|χ2〉 ⊗ |ψ′T 〉+ |χ1〉 ⊗ |ψ′R〉), (7)
where |χ1〉 = |0〉s, |χ2〉 = |1〉s, |ψT 〉 = 1√2 (|ψ′T 〉+ i|ψ′R〉) and |ψT 〉 = 1√2 (|ψ′T 〉 − i|ψ′R〉).
III. PATH-POLARIZATION ENTANGLEMENT AND SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS
Like the BB84 protocol, our path-polarization entangled version involves Alice and Bob agreeing on symbols 0, 1,
2 and 3 being represented by the elements of each of the five bases mentioned above, given by states (4), (5), (6), etc.
We will consider two protocols: one which employs only of the two MUBs, to parallel BB84; the other which includes
the full suite of 5 MUBs.
State preparation and transmission: Alice prepares an intra-particle path-polarization entangled states from one
of the agreed upon bases, and sends that to Bob.
Bob’s measurement: Bob uses mirrors, phase-shifters and beam splitters (Fig. 1) to measure the transmitted
photon, choosing randomly the measurement setting GBj basis, the ‘primed’ versions of G
A
j . He obtains a 2-bit
outcome, which he records.
Key generation: The experiment described in the above two steps is repeated many times. Alice then declares
via an authenticated classical channel the basis (but not the basis element) from which she chooses the state
randomly. (The existence of an authenticated channel between Alice and Bob, which gives Bob an edge over
Eve, is essential to the security of QKD.) After listening to Alice’s group declaration, Bob informs Alice which
experimental data should be kept and which ones should be discarded. The retained data can be potentially
used to distil the secret key, provided they find that the error rate is sufficiently low.
4Classical post-processing. Alice and Bob perform key reconciliation over the authenticed channel, to improve the
correlation of their respective copy of the key. They then perform privacy amplification to minimize Eve’s
information on the key.
The use of entanglement not only enhances the bit rate per particle, but also protects the protocol against some
side-channel attacks, as discussed below. Suppose Eve, the manufacturer of some of the devices used in Alice’s lab rigs
them in a way that they leak side information about their action. For example, the tiny angular momentum acquired
by the QWP through recoil during its rotation of the photon polarization, can in principle be electromagnetically
transmitted outside the lab and monitored by Eve located outside. This side channel can reveal not only Alice’s basis
choice but also the outcome information, thereby entirely compromising a practical realization of BB84-like protocols.
The attack can be mathematically represented as follows:
|b〉|A〉D → |b〉|A〉D (b = 0, 1)
|0〉|P 〉D|0〉ϕ → |+〉|P+〉D|0〉ϕ → |+〉|P 〉D|+〉ϕ
|1〉|P 〉D|0〉ϕ → |−〉|P−〉D|0〉ϕ → |−〉|P 〉D|−〉ϕ (8)
where |A〉, |P 〉 correspond to states of initial absence or presence of some device D, here the QWP; |P±〉, the recoiled
state of the device, carrying a small amount of angular momentum acquired when the photon in a V/H state is
transformed into one of the circular polarization states 1√
2
(|H〉 ± |V 〉); |0〉ϕ, |±〉ϕ are the vacuum state and state of
the electromagnetic leaking channel, produced when the device relaxes back from |P±〉 to its initial state. It may be
noted that the distinction between |P+〉 and |P−〉 is imposed not by unitarity but by angular momentum conservation.
Clearly, the above attack renders standard single-qubit based BB84 fully insecure. For example, in applying the
QWP on state |0〉, Eve effects the transformation
|0〉|P 〉D|0〉ϕ → 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)|P+〉|0〉ϕ → 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)|P 〉|+〉ϕ. (9)
Eve thus obtains not only the basis but also outcome information. On the other hand, suppose Eve attempts this
attack on the above protocol based on intra-particle entanglement. She leaves the group GA1 unaffected, but G
A
2 is
modified. For example, in Alice’s attempt to prepare the state |Φ+〉, she effects the transformation:
1√
2
(|0〉|ψT 〉+ i|1〉|ψR〉) |P 〉D|0〉ϕ → 1√
2
( |0〉s + |1〉s√
2
|+〉ϕ ⊗ |ψT 〉p + i |0〉s − |1〉s√
2
|−〉ϕ ⊗ |ψR〉p
)
|P 〉D
6= |Φ+〉|P 〉D|0〉ϕ (10)
It is easily shown that as as |+〉ϕ and |−〉ϕ become more distinguishable, the intra-particle entanglement decreases,
which is a manifestation of monogamy of entanglement. In particular, if ϕ〈+|−〉ϕ ≡ cos(θ), then the concurrence
(of entanglement) of the state received by Bob is cos2(θ), an effect which can be detected by Bob by testing for
nonlocality. This behavior is a reflection of the monogamy property of nonlocality.
IV. SECURITY CHECK
We model Eve’s attack as a simple intercept-resend attack on single particles, where she measures in one of the
legitimate bases, which are assumed to be publicly known. Eve can also eavesdrop their authenticated classical
channel, and thus make use of their basis announcements. Eve’s strategy is to measure the particles randomly in one
of the legitimate bases. She forwards the measured state to Bob in negligible time, and waits until after their public
announcement of bases to find out when she got it right.
Without loss of generality, suppose Alice sends the state |Φ+〉 and Eve attacks fraction f of particles from Alice
to Bob. Eve has an equal chance of measuring in the right or wrong basis. If she measures in GA2 (with probability
f/2), she always obtains |Φ+〉, which she forwards to Bob, without introducing any error.
On the other hand, if she measures in a basis other than GA2 , she finds any one of the four basis elements with
equal probability. She forwards the obtained state to Bob. After Alice’s public announcement of basis, she is equally
unsure of what state Alice prepared as she is of what state Bob obtained. The error rate e generated is given by the
probability that Alice and Bob, measuring in the same basis, find the wrong outcome, which is, respectively for the
two-basis protocol and the five-basis protocol:
e =
f2
2
× 3
4
=
3f2
8
=⇒ f2 = 8e
3
(11a)
e =
4f5
5
× 3
4
=
3f5
5
=⇒ f5 = 5e
3
. (11b)
5Eve’s average information (symmetrically with respect to Alice or Bob) per transmitted particle is given for the
two protocols as:
I2(A : E) = I2(B : E) = 2×
(
f2
2
+
f2
2
1
4
)
=
10f2
8
=
10e
3
bits. (12a)
I5(A : E) = I5(B : E) = 2×
(
f5
5
+
4f5
5
1
4
)
=
4f5
5
=
4e
3
bits. (12b)
Because of the mutual unbiasedness property between any two bases, after Alice and Bob have reconciled their bases,
Eve’s action induces on any input symbol m, the output probability distribution P (n) where P (n = m) = 1− e and
P (n 6= m) = e3 . The corresponding Shannon entropy functional is given by H
(
1− e, e3 , e3 , e3
)
= −(1− e) log2(1− e)−
e log(e/3).
Assuming Alice sends all 4 states in all bases with equal probability, Bob’s information is given by the mutual
information:
I(A : B) = H(B)−H(B|A)
= 2−H
(
1− e, e
3
,
e
3
,
e
3
)
. (13)
The condition for a positive key rate in a protocol is that
Kα = I(A : B)−min{Iα(A : E), Iα(B : E)} > 0, α ∈ {2, 5}, (14)
whose sign is determined by Eqs. (13) and (12) [20]. Kj is a measure of the secret bits that can be distilled after
Alice and Bob perform key reconciliation and privacy amplification.
Bob’s and Eve’s information on Alice are plotted in Figure 2 both for the two-basis as well as the five-basis protocols.
The tolerable error rate for the former (latter), where Iα(A : E) just exceeds I(A : B), is found to be about 24% ≡ e2
(36% ≡ e5). If Eve launches a more powerful attack, that is, one that increases Iα(A : E) for fixed I(A : B), then
clearly the tolerable error rate in each protocol will be lesser.
By Eve’s interference, she is acting as a depolarizing channel that has the action:
ρkj −→ E2(ρkj ) =
(
1− f2
2
)
ρkj +
f2
2
I4
4
, (15a)
ρkj −→ E5(ρkj ) =
(
1− 4f5
5
)
ρkj +
4f5
5
I4
4
, (15b)
where k (∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) labels the basis and j (∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) labels the basis elements. If Alice transmits an
entangled basis element, then the state in Eq. (15) is (up to local unitaries) a Werner state [21].
Substituting for fα from Eq. (11a) in Eq. (15a), or from Eq. (11b) in Eq. (15b), we find Eve’s depolarizing channel
in terms of error rate:
ρkj −→ Eα(ρkj ) =
(
1− 4e
3
)
ρkj +
4e
3
I4
4
, α ∈ {2, 5}. (16)
If Alice sends a separable basis element, then Eve’s attack, which depolarizes Alice’s state, does not affect the
entanglement. On the other hand, suppose the input is ρ21 ≡ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|, so that Bob receives (up to a local unitary)
a Werner state as determined by Eq. (15).
It is known that Bell-type inequalities for multipartite separable states are exponentially stronger than local-realism
inequalities [22]. In the present case, let the measurement settings on the first and second qubit (i.e., the polarization
and path qubit) be given by the following directions:
~a1 = iˆ,~a2 = jˆ,~a3 =
1√
2
iˆ+
1√
2
jˆ,
~b1 =
1√
2
iˆ+
1√
2
jˆ,~b2 =
−1√
2
iˆ+
1√
2
jˆ,~b3 = jˆ (17)
which are used for evaluating one of the following Bell correlations
S = E(~a1,~b1) + E(~a2,~b1) + E(~a1,~b2)− E(~a2,~b2). (18)
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FIG. 2: The descending curve is Bob’s information as a function of error rate e (Eq. (13)). The upper (lower) ascending line
Eve’s information (Eq. (12)) when Alice and Bob choose two (all five) mutually unbiased bases for preparing the input symbol
states. The tolerable error rate is about 24% (36%) when two (five) bases are used for encoding. For Eve’s depolarizing action
Eq. (16), the noisy state is nonlocal for e < elocal ≈ 0.17 (Eq. (25), first vertical line) and entangled for e < eent = 0.5 (Eq.
(26), second vertical line). Thus the intercept-resend attack on both protocols allows secure states that are local, but never
secure states that are disentangled.
It is readily shown that for local-realist models, S ≤ SLR = 2. The correlation for the singlet is given by
E(~ai,~bj) = −(~ai,~bj), (19)
so that S = −2√2 = √2SLR. The most general separable state is given by
ρsep =
∫ ∫
σ(~na, ~nb)|na〉〈na| ⊗ |nb〉〈nb|d~nad~nb, (20)
where
∫ ∫
σ(~na, ~nb)d~nad~nb = 1 and
~na = sin θa cosφaiˆ+ sin θa sinφajˆ + cos θakˆ
~nb = sin θb cosφbiˆ+ sin θb sinφbjˆ + cos θbkˆ (21)
The correlations for ρsep can be calculated as
E(~ai,~bj) = Tr[ρsep~σ.~ai ⊗ ~σ.~bj ] (22)
Using equations Eqs. (17), (18), (19) and (20), the upper and lower bound of the quantity S in Eq. (18) is given by
S =
√
2
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
σ(θa, θb, φa, φb) sin
2 θa sin
2 θb sin(φa + φb)dθadθbdφadφb
⇒ −
√
2 ≤ S ≤
√
2, (23)
7so that quantum bound for separable states, Smax:sep =
√
2 < SLR.
Each element of the entangled bases is locally equivalent to a Bell state, and yields a Bell inequality violation of
2
√
2 for suitable settings, whereas S(I4) = 0. After Alice’s public announcement of bases, she and Bob divide the
transmitted states into sub-ensembles corresponding to each symbol state.
In view of Eq. (16), for a given sub-ensemble corresponding to an entangled symbol state, Bob observes:
S =
(
1− 4e
3
)
2
√
2. (24)
This is nonlocal when 〈S〉 > SLR = 2, or
e <
3
4
(
1− 1√
2
)
≡ eLR. (25)
From Eq. (16), setting
(
1− 4e3
)
> 13 as the necessary and sufficient condition for entanglement [23] of Werner states
by the Peres-Horodecki positive-partial-transpose criterion [21], we find that Bob’s states are entangled when
e <
1
2
≡ eent. (26)
Since e2 > eLR and e5 > eLR, it follows that there are local states that allow secrecy extraction for both protocols
under the considered attack.
The corresponding values of S are, from Eq. (16), S2 =
(
1− 4e23
)
2
√
2 ≈ 1.36Smax:sep, and similarly S5 ≈
1.04Smax:sep, implying that e2 < eent and e5 < eent (cf. Figure 2). In other words, all states under the protocol
for the given class of attacks are necessarily entangled. Since the considered attacks are clearly not the strongest
possible for the protocols considered, this implies that security or secrecy is a strictly stronger condition than entan-
glement (in that more powerful attacks will reduce the tolerable error rate, and thus increase the amount entanglement
in the state at the security threshold). It is interesting to note that in the case of the BB84 protocol, interpreted as
an Ekert91-like protocol, the concepts of nonlocality and security coincide [6, 7], whereas in the device-independent
scenario, security is a stronger condition than nonlocality [24].
The above analysis cryptographically illustrates the difference between nonlocality and entanglement. In particular,
it shows that security, nonlocality and entanglement are distinct resources. Security is more aligned with privacy of
randomness, which is known to be distinct from nonlocality and entanglement [25].
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed the use of intra-particle entanglement in a BB84-like protocol for realizing QKD. This has the
virtue of enhancing security against a class of side-channel attacks, while being easy to experimentally implement,
as it requires only linear optics. In particular, an attack that reveals side-information about the photon’s angular
momentum would be undetected in a standard implementation of BB84, whereas our intra-particle entanglement
reveals the attack via a reduction in correlation.
The security of two protocols, one using two mutually unbiased bases, and another using five, are analyzed under
a simple incoherent attack. We find that secrecy is a strictly stronger condition than entanglement. On the other
hand, there are some local states that allow extraction of secret bits. Our results demonstrate cryptographically that
nonlocality, entanglement and secrecy are related but inequivalent concepts, the last being more akin to privacy of
randomness.
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